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Historically, individuals who smoked typically felt free to do so
when and where they pleased. Indeed, smoking in public places,
including places of work, was generally unrestricted. Today, how-
ever, the interests of smokers and nonsmokers often compete on
the job. This is especially true in workplaces where employees
work side-by-side for long periods of time. While some employees
adamantly seek to preserve their "right" to smoke on the job,
other nonsmoking employees are pushing for a "right" to a smoke-
free work environment. And, while smoking disputes are still gen-
erally resolved informally by management, now legislatures,
courts and unions have become embroiled in the controversy.
In this Article, the authors present an overview of workplace
smoking issues by surveying relevant case law, analyzing state and
local legislation, and addressing the prominent role of unions re-
garding smoking in the workplace. In addition, the authors offer
practical suggestions to employers about how to accommodate the
competing interests of both smokers and nonsmokers. In doing so,
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the authors hope to assist employers in resolving workplace smok-
ing issues.
I. BACKGROUND
Eighty-eight percent of all employers in the United States per-
mit smoking in the workplace.' Of those employers that permit
smoking, approximately one-half currently have no formal smok-
ing policy.2 Twelve percent of major employers in the United
States ban smoking on the job.3 Of the employers that ban smok-
ing in the workplace, many appear to do so around food prepara-
tion stations or where employees work near combustible materials.
For example, gasoline refineries and chemical processing compa-
nies ban smoking almost uniformly due to the severe safety con-
siderations attendant to those workplaces. Similarly, product con-
tamination concerns led the Campbell Soup Company to ban
smoking in the workplace beginning in approximately 1896.
Approximately one-fourth of adult Americans smoke.4 Higher
incidences of smoking have been associated with lower income
groups and blacks.5 It is therefore possible to experience great var-
iations in the percentage of smokers and nonsmokers in any par-
ticular work force. Accordingly, employers often face competing
1. BNA, WHERE THERE'S SMOKE: PROBLEMS AND POLICIES CONCERNING SMOKING
IN THE WORKPLACE, A SPECIAL REPORT 20 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter BNA, SPECIAL
REPORT].
2. According to one survey of 1,100 employers, 63.8% have no formal smoking pol-
icy. A more recent survey of 623 employers indicated that 43% have no such policy. See
infra note 109.
3. The vast majority of employers permit smoking somewhere on company premises.
51 % percent prohibit smoking in open work areas and shared work spaces. BNA, SPECIAL
REPORT, supra note 1, at. 20.
4. According to 1987 statistics compiled by the Centers for Disease Control, 26.5%
of adults in the United States smoke. Id. at 12.
5. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVs., THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING-CANCER AND CHRONIC LUNG DISEASE IN THE
"WORKPLACE, REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 48-55 (1985) [hereinafter SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT].
A 1986 study conducted by the Centers for Disease Control found that black men
smoked at a rate of 32.5 % while white men smoked at a rate of 29.3 %. The prevalence of
smoking was only slightly higher among black women (25.1%) than white women
(23.7%). See Cigarette Smoking in the United States, 1986, MORBITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REPORT 582 (Sept. I1, 1987) (distributed by the Massachusetts Medical
Society).
A 1985 national health interview survey conducted by the National Center for Health
Statistics also found greater incidences of smoking among blacks. See PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., VITAL HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH
PROIOTION AND DISEASE PREVENTION UNITED STATES 70 (1988).
For a collection of the results of numerous nationwide studies concerning the prevalence
of smoking among blacks and whites, see Ethridge & Fox, Toward a Civil Rights Ap-
proach to Smoking, CURRENTS (April 1987) attachment I (published by the American
Association for Affirmative Action).
[Vol. 25
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SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE
interests of a large group of smokers or an even larger group of
nonsmokers. As a result, most employers find it prudent to accom-
modate, if possible, the competing interests of both smoking and
nonsmoking employees. This is particularly true in this era of
growing labor shortages, in which employers increasingly seek to
retain happy and productive employees.6
While the decision to permit or limit smoking in the workplace
is largely left to the discretion of employers, there are legal and
practical limitations to such discretion. Accordingly, companies
must proceed with care after a full evaluation of the facts and
pertinent law. Further, employers are warned that the law regard-
ing workplace smoking is still evolving.
The most significant limitations to management discretion re-
garding smoking in the workplace include:
(1) The common law duty to accommodate both smoking and
nonsmoking employees;7
(2) Federal regulations, state statutes or local ordinances which
limit smoking in the workplace;8
(3) The duty to bargain collectively with unionized employees
about workplace smoking policies;9
(4) Management's obligation to accommodate nonsmoking em-
ployees who are found to be "medically hypersensitive" to envi-
ronmental tobacco smoke (ETS) and who thus may be designated
as "handicapped" pursuant to federal, state or local handicap
laws;10 and
(5) The mandates of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
(Title VII) and other discrimination laws, which prohibit em-
ployer policies which have a "disparate impact" on minority and
female employees."
Cases involving smoking may be based on constitutional rights,
handicap discrimination acts, the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA), Title VII, the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), unemployment and workers' compensation laws, and
common law theories, including wrongful discharge and
negligence.
Discussed below are the various legal causes of action employ-
6. A recent survey indicates that a majority of human resource managers polled are
most concerned with issues related to recruiting and retaining good employees. Nearly
60% responded that their greatest challenge is maintaining a competent and contented
work force. 2 WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION, A SURVEY OF PERSONNEL POLICIES IN
THE WORKPLACE (1988).
7. See infra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 67-91 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
I1. See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
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ees have brought on both sides of the issue.12 In general, the
courts have been quite hostile to the claims of nonsmokers seeking
a legal right to a smoke-free work environment. That same con-
clusion also appears to be emerging in the new wave of "smokers'
rights" cases. The consensus of the courts appears to be that, ab-
sent any legislative limitation on management's discretion, em-
ployers need to accommodate the competing interests of both
smoking and nonsmoking employees. For example, management
must accommodate "handicapped" employees who are found to be
medically "hypersensitive" to environmental tobacco smoke.13 On
the other hand, unionized workers may have a right to smoke un-
less and until management has bargained in good faith to limit
smoking in the workplace.14 At the same time, management must
comply with any state statutes or local ordinances which may ad-
dress smoking in the workplace.' 5
Inevitably, employers find themselves positioned between the
competing interests of smokers and nonsmokers alike. In this situ-
ation, employers are well-advised to promptly and effectively ac-
commodate these competing interests so as to avoid disruptive bat-
tles between employees. In some situations, employers may
consider voluntarily formulating a reasonable smoking policy to
assist them toward this end.
II. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO WORKPLACE SMOKING
Workplace smoking issues have been litigated in the courts in a
variety of contexts. Beginning in 1976, nonsmokers filed the first
of a series of "test cases" seeking the legal right to a smoke-free
12. This Article does not address health or product liability litigation issues concern-
ing tobacco use. For a discussion of the scientific evidence relating to environmental to-
bacco smoke, see generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO
SMOKE: MEASURING EXPOSURES AND ASSESSING HEALTH EFFECTS (1986) [hereinafter
NAS REPORT]; SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL TOBACCO
SMOKE-THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING (1986) [hereinafter
SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT]; 38 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL
AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER, IARC MONOGRAPH ON THE EVALUATION OF THE
CARCINOGENIC RISK OF CHEMICALS TO HUMANS: TOBACCO SMOKING 308 (1986) [herein-
after IARC MONOGRAPH]; and PROCEEDINGS OF INDOOR AND AMBIENT AIR QUALITY
CONFERENCE, Imperial College (London, England, June 13-15, 1988) [hereinafter
PROCEEDINGS].
See also Comment, Judicial and Legislative Control of the Tobacco Industry: Toward a
Smoke-Free Society?, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 317 (1987); and Crist & Majoras, The "New"
Wave In Smoking and Health Litigation-Is Anything Really So New?, 54 TENN. L. REV.
551 (1987).
13. See Parodi v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 702 F.2d 743, 749-51 (9th Cir. 1982);
see also infra notes 37 & 38 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 67-86 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 25
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SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE
work environment.' 6 With a few limited exceptions, the courts
have been hostile to the claims of healthy nonsmokers seeking a
legal right to a smoke-free work environment. Instead, the general
response of the courts has been that this is an issue best left to
management discretion or the legislative process. I"
A. Constitutional Claims
The courts have summarily rejected the notion that employees
or members of the public have a constitutional right to an environ-
ment free of tobacco smoke. In the leading decision, Gasper v.
Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District," a group of non-
smokers sought to prohibit smoking during sports and other public
events at the Louisiana Superdome. The plaintiffs claimed that
their exposure to tobacco smoke in the Superdome infringed upon
their rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the
plaintiffs in Gasper alleged that exposure to tobacco smoke at the
Superdome infringed upon their first amendment right to receive
ideas; deprived them of life, liberty and property without due pro-
cess in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments; and
breached their fundamental privacy rights guaranteed by the
ninth amendment. The court rejected each of the plaintiffs' consti-
tutional arguments, and stated that to hold that the Constitution
prohibits smoking would be to create an unprecedented avenue
"through which an individual could attempt to regulate the social
habits of his neighbor."' 9
Likewise, in Kensell v. Oklahoma,20 a public employee's consti-
tutional challenge to workplace smoking was also rejected. In this
case, the court unequivocally stated that "the United States Con-
stitution does not empower the federal judiciary ... to impose no-
smoking rules in the plaintiffs workplace."'" In sum, every court
faced with the issue has concluded that employees have no consti-
tutionally protected right to a smoke-free work environment.2"
16. See Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tele., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (1976).
17. See, e.g., Federal Employees for Nonsmokers' Rights v. United States, 446 F.
Supp. 181, 185 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
926; Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 722 (E.D. La.
1976); McCarthy v. Social and Health Servs., 110 Wash. 2d 812, 826, 759 P.2d 351, 358
(1988).
18. 418 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1073 (1979).
19. Id. at 721.
20. 716 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir. 1983).
21. Id. at 1351.
22. See also Federal Employees for Nonsmokers' Rights v. United States, 446 F.
Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 310 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926
(1979) (smoking in federal buildings does not violate Constitution); GASP v. Mecklenburg
1989]
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Similarly, the corollary to the nonsmokers' challenge, i.e., the
smoker's asserted constitutional "right" to smoke, has also been
rejected. In Rossie v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue,23 the
state intermediate appellate court found that a Wisconsin statute
prohibiting smoking in all but certain designated areas of a state-
controlled building did not violate the fourteenth amendment
equal protection clause.
A prohibition against off-duty smoking, a restriction thus far
imposed almost uniquely upon some police, fire and other public
safety officers, has also withstood constitutional challenge.24 In
Grusendorf v. Oklahoma City2" the court upheld a fire depart-
ment's ban on off-duty smoking applicable to fire fighter trainees.
The Grusendorf court agreed with the plaintiff that the smoking
ban infringed upon liberty and privacy rights, stating:
It can hardly be disputed that the Oklahoma City Fire Depart-
ment's nonsmoking regulation infringes upon the liberty and pri-
vacy of fire fighter trainees. The regulation reaches well beyond
the work place and well beyond the hours for which they receive
pay. It burdens them after their shift has ended, restricts them
on weekends and vacations, in their automobiles and backyards
and even, with the doors closed and the shades drawn, in the
private sanctuary of their own homes.26
Despite this finding, the court upheld the smoking ban because,
under the circumstances, the city satisfied its burden of proving
that the ban bore a rational relationship to the promotion of the
health and safety of the fire fighters. Nevertheless, employer re-
strictions against off-duty behavior give rise to serious privacy
County, 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979) (smoking in county buildings and facili-
ties not unconstitutional).
23. 133 Wis. 2d 341, 395 N.W.2d 801 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied, 134 Wis.
2d 457, 401 N.W.2d 10 (1987).
24. Fire fighters in many states are protected by "heart and lung" statutes which
create a presumption that any cardiovascular or respiratory conditions suffered are work-
related. These statutes are often used to justify off-duty smoking bans. See generally Roth-
stein, Refusing to Employ Smokers: Good Public Health or Bad Public Policy, 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 940, 952-53 (1987).
Most smoking bans have been promulgated at the local level. Approximately 32 localities
currently discriminate against smokers when hiring fire fighters, police officers and other
public safety employees. Massachusetts is currently the only state to ban smoking by newly
hired recruits.
The most stringent hiring policies call for refusal to hire smokers, require signatures of
agreement not to smoke, call for possible termination upon violation, and have, in some
instances, been written into collective bargaining agreements. Several localities have ex-
pressed a general preference for nonsmoking employees if a choice must be made between
a smoker and a nonsmoker. At least one jurisdiction requires mandatory attendance at
"health seminars," which include compulsory exercise and nonsmoking educational
programs.
25. 816 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1987).
26. Id. at 541.
[Vol. 25
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concerns and are likely to be challenged in the future." Moreover,
where the smoking restrictions apply only to part of the work
force, such as new hires, they are likely to be challenged on equal
protection grounds. 28 These issues have yet to be fully litigated in
the courts.
B. Statutory Claims
Nonsmokers have relied upon numerous statutes attempting to
limit smoking in the workplace or, alternatively, to obtain finan-
cial benefits if they believe they cannot continue working in the
presence of tobacco smoke. These statutory bases include federal
and state handicap laws, disability statutes and workers' compen-
sation laws.29
Despite these attempts, the courts have generally refused to re-
strict workplace smoking. Some courts, however, have held that
employees claiming severe adverse reactions to tobacco smoke are
"handicapped" or "disabled" or may be able to recover workers'
compensation benefits.
In Vickers v. Veterans Administration,"0 the court found that
an employee was "handicapped" within the meaning of section
504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 197331 when it found
him to be "hypersensitive" 3 2 to tobacco smoke and physically una-
27. See Max, The Company Is Watching You Everywhere, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15,
1987, § 4, at 21, col. 2; Leap, When Can You Fire for Off-duty Conduct?, 66 HARV. Bus.
REV., 28-30, Jan.-Feb. 1988.
28. In Grusendorf, the court specifically questioned whether the smoking ban, which
applied only to fire fighter trainees, could withstand an attack on equal protection grounds.
The court refused, however, to consider this issue because it was not raised by the parties.
816 F.2d at 543.
29. The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(1982) currently provides no remedy for nonsmokers seeking a smoke-free work environ-
ment. Tobacco smoke is not listed by OSHA as a "toxic and hazardous substance." See 29
C.F.R. § 1910.1000-1910.1500 (1988). Indeed, in 1987 OSHA denied a citizen petition
requesting OSHA to classify tobacco smoke as a potential occupational carcinogen and
develop a standard for "tobacco smoke." BNA, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES at A-24
(Mar. 2, 1987). In addition, OSHA administrators have consistently refused to accept
complaints based solely on workplace smoking and, thus, apparently do not perceive that
environmental tobacco smoke constitutes a violation of an employer's statutory duty to pro-
vide a "healthful" working environment. Moreover, OSHA provides no private right of
action for employees who seek to restrict workplace smoking. See Federal Employees for
Nonsmokers Rights v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 181 (D.D.C. 1978), af'd, 598 F.2d 310,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979); Barrera v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours, 653 F.2d 915, 920
(5th Cir. 1981).
30. 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982). The Rehabilitation Act imposes affirmative action
and nondiscrimination obligations upon a limited group of employers: federal agencies, fed-
eral contractors, and recipients of federal assistance.
32. The Vickers court used the terms "hypersensitivity" and "unusually sensitive"
interchangeably. See 549 F. Supp. at 87. In medical terms, "hypersensitivity" is defined as
"a state of altered reactivity in which the body reacts with an exaggerated response to a
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ble to perform his job in the presence of environmental tobacco
smoke.31 In GASP v. Mecklenburg County,34 however, the court
rejected similar claims, cautioning that the term "handicap" was
not intended to include all persons who claim to suffer from a
pulmonary problem, however minor, or those who are simply irri-
tated by tobacco smoke.
In the workers' compensation context, a California court has
held that a nurse who left her job because of "allergic" reactions
to tobacco smoke was eligible for unemployment compensation
until she could find alternative employment in a smoke-free envi-
ronment.3 5 A Louisiana court has denied unemployment benefits
under similar circumstances because it found that the employee's
preexisting allergy, which was not aggravated by her employment,
did not constitute "good cause" for her resignation. 6
In Parodi v. Merit Systems Protection Board,3 7 a federal em-
ployee who claimed to be hypersensitive to tobacco smoke was
found to be "disabled." Nevertheless, the Parodi court found that
the employee would not be entitled to disability benefits if the em-
ployer offered her a reasonable accommodation by transfer to a
comparable job in a smoke-free work area. 8
While each case is based on its own set of facts, these cases
seem to indicate that currently only those found to have the most
foreign agent." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 635 (26th ed. 1981).
This term must not be confused with "allergy" or "allergic reaction." To date, no spe-
cific antigens have been identified in tobacco smoke, and when individuals claim to be
"allergic" to smoke, at best, they can be said to suffer from non-specific responses to smoke
exposure. See Lehrer, Tobacco Smoke Sensitivity: A Result of Allergy?, ANNALS OF AL-
LERGY 56, May 1986, at 1-10.
33. The Vickers court did not award any injunctive or monetary relief, however, be-
cause it found that (1) the employer did not discriminate against plaintiff by reason of his
handicap; and (2) the employer made reasonable efforts to accommodate plaintiff. 549 F.
Supp. at 87-89. For a thorough analysis of the Vickers decision see Comment, Limited
Relief for Federal Employees Hypersensitive to Tobacco Smoke: Federal Employer's
Who'd Rather Fight May Have to Switch, 59 WASH. L. REv. 305, 312-22 (1984). See also
Department of Fair Employment and Hous. v. Fresno County, FEHC Dec. No. 81-82 (C8-
0009 ph) (1984) (employee allergic to tobacco smoke found to be "handicapped" under
California Fair Employment and Housing Act).
34. 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477 (1979).
35. Alexander v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 104 Cal. App. 3d 97,
163 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1980). See also McCrocklin v. Employment Dev. Dept., 156 Cal. App.
3d 1067, 205 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1984) (employee's "good-faith fear" that smoke-filled room
was harmful to his health found "reasonable" and employee entitled to unemployment
benefits).
36. Billman v. Sumrall, 464 So. 2d 382 (La. App. 1985). But see Lapham v. Penn-
sylvania Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 103 Pa. Commw. 144, 519 A.2d
1101 (1987) (bronchitis sufferer entitled to collect unemployment benefits where proffered
physical relocation was deemed not a "reasonable accommodation"); McCrocklin, 156 Cal.
App. 3d 1067, 205 Cal. Rptr. 156.
37. 690 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1982), as amended, 702 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1982).
38. For a thorough analysis of Parodi. see Comment, supra note 33, at 308-22.
[Vol. 25
8
California Western Law Review, Vol. 25 [2015], No. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol25/iss2/2
SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE
severe reactions to tobacco smoke will be considered "handi-
capped" or "disabled."3 9 On the other hand, an employee who is
merely "irritated" or "annoyed" is not typically found to be
"medically hypersensitive."40 Private employers subject to state
handicapped statutes, or federal contractors covered by section
503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, may accordingly also have
a duty to reasonably accommodate employees found to be hyper-
sensitive where such an accommodation would not pose an "undue
hardship" on the employer or the rest of its work force. Yet, as
the court recognized in Vickers, "the desires of those employees
who wish to smoke cannot be disregarded.'
An employer's offer to transfer the "handicapped" individual to
a comparable position in a smoke-free work area would appear to
be sufficient accommodation.42 But when a medically hypersensi-
tive employee is unable to continue working, he or she may be
entitled to disability or workers' compensation benefits. Despite
this fact, employers have great latitude to accommodate the com-
peting interests of smoking and nonsmoking employees because
the foregoing cases do not impose any affirmative obligation upon
employers to restrict workplace smoking.
C. Discrimination Claims
There is also a possibility that employers' policies or practices
limiting smoking in the workplace may trigger "disparate impact"
discrimination claims. 43 Because a greater percentage of blacks in
the United States smoke than whites, outright hiring bans or other
policies which unduly restrict smoking in the workplace may dis-
proportionately affect black employees.44 Thus, these actions could
39. See, e.g., Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85, 87 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
40. See, e.g., GASP v. Mecklenburg County, 42 N.C. App. 225, 256 S.E.2d 477
(1979); Gordon v. Raven Sys. & Research, 462 A.2d 10, 15 (D.C. App. 1983).
41. Vickers, 549 F. Supp. at 89.
42. See Parodi, 702 F.2d at 749-51.
43. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1982) prohibits em-
ployer policies which, while facially neutral, "operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In
other words, Title VII prohibits otherwise neutral employment practices which dispropor-
tionately affect protected groups.
Employer smoking restrictions may also be challenged under Title VII if individuals are
subjected to "disparate treatment" because of their race, sex, religion or national origin. In
such cases, the plaintiffs must prove that the employer intended to treat them differently on
account of their protected status. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). But see Moore v. Inmont Corp., 608 F. Supp. 919 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (Title VII
claim rejected where black employee discharged for violating smoking policy related to
safety standards that was applied equally to all employees).
44. The results of smoking prevalence studies vary depending on the year and sample
size. However, the studies uniformly report a greater incidence of smoking among blacks
than whites. For example, in 1980, 47.7% of black males smoked, compared with 40.2%
1989]
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be challenged under state or federal discrimination laws.45 Once
an employee shows that an employer's otherwise neutral smoking
policy or practice has a statistically significant disproportionate
impact on blacks, the employee has made out a prima facie case
of discrimination under Title VII.46 In order to defend, the em-
ployer must then successfully demonstrate that the policy or prac-
tice is justified by a "business necessity. '47 Some smoking restric-
tions, such as those prohibiting smoking near hazardous or
flammable materials, may constitute a "business necessity. '48 Un-
less required by statute or ordinance, however, it is unlikely that
courts would find that the preferences of co-employees or custom-
ers rise to the level of a business necessity.4 9 Even so, the court
could still find a Title VII violation if the employee proves that
there are other alternatives which accomplish the same business
purpose, yet have less impact on blacks.5 °
Accordingly, employers need to examine carefully current or
proposed workplace smoking restrictions to ensure that they do
not discriminate against protected groups. If they do, the em-
ployer must be prepared to establish that the smoking policy
adopted is justified by legitimate business purposes and is the least
drastic means of accomplishing the employer's goals.
of white males. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 5, at 49. See also supra note 5.
45. For a comprehensive discussion of smoking and civil rights issues, see Ethridge &
Fox, supra note 5.
46. A prima facie case is sufficient to prove a Title VII violation, unless contradicted
or overcome by other evidence. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
47. To prove a business necessity, an employer may show that the policy or practice
has a "manifest relationship" to performance of the job in question (i.e., that it is a "job-
related criterion"). Alternatively, the employer may seek to prove that the policy or prac-
tice in question is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. "[A] dis-
criminatory employment practice must be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job
performance to survive a Title VII challenge." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332
n.14 (1977).
48. See, e.g., Moore v. Inmont Corp., 608 F. Supp. 919, 927 (W.D.N.C. 1985).
49. See Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982)(employer is forbidden by Title VII to refuse to hire someone on racial grounds because his
customers or clientele do not like his race); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971) (Pan Am violated Title VII when it banned
employment of male flight attendants despite passenger preferences for female flight at-
tendants); Bing v. Roadway Enter., 444 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1971) (invalidating a motor
freight company's rule that an employee who desired to transfer to another job must resign
his present position and thereby forfeit accrued employment rights. Finding the rule to
have an adverse impact on blacks, the court rejected the company's argument that the rule
was "necessitated" by the prospect of employee unhappiness with the demise of the rule).
Accord Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 954 (1971).
50. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). If an employer meets the bur-
den of showing that its tests or selection devices are job-related, the burden then shifts to
the complaining party to show that other less discriminatory selection devices would also
serve the employer's legitimate interests. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
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SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE
D. Common Law Claims
An employer's general common law duty to provide a reasona-
bly safe working environment for its employees has been codified
by federal and state occupational safety and health (OSHA)
laws.51 In an attempt to restrict workplace smoking, employees
have filed several lawsuits claiming that such smoking violates this
general common law duty. However, only one lower court deci-
sion, in New Jersey, Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone,52 has
found an employer permitting smoking in the workplace to have
violated this duty. The remainder of the courts confronted with
this issue have declined to find the duty violated and have refused
to restrict workplace smoking. Thus, there is currently little, if
any, authority for imposing a common law obligation upon em-
ployers to restrict smoking in the workplace.
In Shimp, a secretary who claimed to suffer from a severe "al-
lergic" reaction to tobacco smoke sought an injunction to prevent
other employees from smoking in her work area. Plaintiff submit-
ted medical opinions in support of her request for an injunction.
The employer, on the other hand, failed to put forth any evidence
to refute the plaintiff's claims. Not surprisingly, the New Jersey
Superior Court found that the employer had a common law duty
to provide safe working conditions. Accordingly, it directed the
employer to restrict smoking to the lunchroom.53
A key determinant of the outcome of Shimp was a lack of any
active defense by New Jersey Bell, which filed no answer or affi-
davits in opposition to the plaintiff's request for an injunction. It is
quite possible that the result in Shimp might have been different
had it not been uncontested and had New Jersey Bell, instead,
presented a true "case and controversy." Significantly, an identi-
cal complaint subsequently filed by Ms. Shimp's attorney before
the same judge on behalf of another New Jersey Bell employee
was summarily dismissed.54 The only difference between the two
cases is that the employer elected to defend itself in the later case.
Also, seven years later in Smith v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,55
51. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982) (Federal OSHA). Section 654(a) sets forth the
so-called "general duty" clause, which requires that an employer "shall furnish to each of
his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized
hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employ-
ees." See also supra note 29.
See also CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 6300-6711 (Deering Supp. 1988) (Cal-OSHA). Section
6400 provides that "[e]very employer shall furnish employment and a place of employment
which are safe and healthful for the employees therein."
52. 145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408 (1976).
53. Id. at 531, 368 A.2d at 416.
54. Mitchell v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., No. C-4159-76 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.).
55. No. C-3617-81E, 16-17 (N.J. Super. Ct., Aug. 18, 1983).
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the New Jersey Superior Court rejected and dismissed a similar
claim by a nonsmoking employee who also claimed to be hyper-
sensitive to cigarette smoke. The court held that the safety of the
workplace was to be judged by reference to the "typical" em-
ployee, not the hypersensitive employee.56 Moreover, the court
limited the holding in Shimp, stating:
Insofar as the Shimp case is read by some as requiring an em-
ployer to institute Draconian measures to smoking employees I
think it has to be viewed somewhat skeptically and cautiously. I
myself have no problem at all with the basic concept of Shimp,
that a safe workplace is required, but I must say it seems to me
that some of the prohibitions contained in the Shimp case are
too sweeping and go well beyond what is necessary to ensure a
safe working place.57
The court therefore concluded that the nonsmoking "supersensi-
tive" employee had no right to a smoke-free environment.
A District of Columbia court reached the same conclusion in
Gordon v. Raven Systems & Research, Inc.58 In Gordon, the em-
ployer terminated an employee after she refused to work in an
area containing some tobacco smoke. The employee subsequently
filed a lawsuit contending that the employer was negligent in not
providing her with a smoke-free workplace. The court dismissed
the employee's claim, because the plaintiff had presented no evi-
dence to support her allegations that tobacco smoke was harmful
to employees. Significantly, too, the District of Columbia court
held that the employer had no duty to conform the workplace to
the particular needs or sensitivities of an individual employee.59
Likewise, the trial court in Smith v. AT&T Technologies60 also
rejected an employee's claim that the employer breached its com-
mon law duty to maintain a safe working environment. This con-
clusion was based on the court's finding that "the tobacco smoke
in plaintiff's former work area was [not] hazardous to the health
of plaintiff or the health of the other employees in that area.""1
56. Id. at 15. ("It simply is not right in terms of the way in which human beings
have to relate to one another, that because someone is as sensitive as that all the rest of the
world has to go through a tightly-controlled regimen of smoking discipline"). Id. at 13.
("[Smokers] are after all human beings with needs and feelings like everyone else, and
there simply is no matter of civilized management of a work force to treat smokers as
though they were moral lepers and to banish them to a remote isolated area of the
workplace").
57. Id. at 8.
58. 462 A.2d 10 (D.C. App. 1983).
59. Id. at 15.
60. No. 4446121 (St. Louis Cty. Cir. Ct., Apr. 23, 1985). This case was on remand
from an earlier decision, Smith v. Western Elec. Co., 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. App. 1982),
which recognized that employers have a common law duty to provide a safe workplace.
61. Smith, No. 4446121, at 3 (St. Louis Cty. Cir. Ct., Apr. 23, 1985).
[Vol. 25
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The court added that the employer was not required to provide a
"comfortable" workplace.62
While there is thus far only a single ruling to support the alle-
gation that environmental tobacco smoke causes harm to non-
smokers, employers nevertheless must be careful not to retaliate
against employees who protest corporate policies permitting smok-
ing. In Hentzel v. Singer Co.,"3 a California court held that an
employee could state a common law retaliatory dismissal claim
after being terminated for protesting hazardous working condi-
tions. The court did so without addressing whether the alleged
hazard (environmental tobacco smoke) was, in fact, hazardous.
Overall, the courts have been reluctant to find any common law
basis for restricting workplace smoking in the absence of sufficient
proof that environmental tobacco smoke causes significant medical
harm to nonsmokers. 4 With the exception of the now dated and
criticized 1976 Shimp decision, the courts have declined to ex-
pand an employer's common law duty to provide a safe working
environment to encompass a smoke-free working environment.6 5
62. Id. at 4.
63. 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982).
64. In fact, no link has been shown between ETS and chronic adverse health effects.
Both the Surgeon General and the National Academy of Sciences found that available
studies preclude any firm conclusion about the relationship between exposure to ETS and
cardiovascular disease and that further studies are needed to determine whether any real
link exists. See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 12, at 14; NAS REPORT,
supra note 12, at 11. In addition, the Surgeon General's report concluded that "a previ-
ously healthy individual would not develop chronic lung disease solely on the basis of invol-
untary tobacco smoke exposure in adult life." SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note
12, at 62. Finally, both the Surgeon General and the National Academy of Sciences re-
ports emphasize critical limitations on their finding of a possible connection between expo-
sure to ETS and lung cancer. Upon reviewing the same evidence considered by the NAS
and the Surgeon General, the International Agency for Research on Cancer of the World
Health Organization concluded, also in late 1986, that the available evidence is equally
consistent with the finding of an increase in risk or an absence of risk. IARC MONOGRAPH,
supra note 12, at 308. A number of other studies published since 1986 also contradict the
limited findings of the Surgeon General and NAS reports with respect to the purported
relationship between ETS and lung cancer. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at 242-
50, 252-58.
65. In 1986, a Massachusetts court rejected a nonsmoker's claim against her em-
ployer based on breach of contract, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Bernard v. Cameron & Colby Co., 397 Mass. 320, 491 N.E.2d 604 (1986). But, in
McCarthy v. Washington, I10 Wash. 2d 812, 759 P.2d 351 (1988), the Washington Su-
preme Court recently held that an employee who allegedly developed lung disease as a
result of exposure to tobacco smoke in the workplace was not preempted by workers' com-
pensation laws from stating a cause of action against her former employer for negli-
gence-a finding inconsistent with existing labor law precedents. While four justices opined
in dicta that employers have a common law duty to provide a smoke-free work environ-
ment, that conclusion was specifically rejected by a majority of the court. See id. at 826,
759 P.2d at 358 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting). In a statement issued by the Washington
State Attorney General's office, a spokesperson for the attorney general said that the dicta
of the three justices in McCarthy did not establish binding law on the issue of an em-
ployer's duty to provide a "reasonably safe" workplace. 26 GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYMENT
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Indeed, several courts that have addressed the issue to date have
recognized the need to consider the interests of both smokers and
nonsmokers.6
III. WORKPLACE SMOKING LEGISLATION
In addition to analyzing case law, the workplace smoking issue
demands a careful review of relevant state and local legislation.67
Thirteen states to date have enacted legislation specifically regu-
lating smoking in private workplaces. 68 These are: (1) Connecti-
cut;69 (2) Florida;70 (3) Iowa;71 (4) Maine;72 (5) Minnesota;7 (6)
Montana;7 4 (7) Nebraska; 75 (8) New Hampshire;76  (9) New
Jersey;77 (10) Rhode Island;78 (11) Utah;7 9 (12) Vermont;80 and
(13) Washington.81
These state laws vary greatly, especially in the degree to which
they attempt to displace the role of the employer and its employ-
ees in resolving workplace smoking issues. However, virtually all
of the state laws have the following common features:
(1) None of the state laws entirely bans smoking in the
workplace; 82
RELATIONS REPORT 1172 (Aug. 1988). A trial on the merits in McCarthy is scheduled for
October 1989.
66. See Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 531, 386 A.2d 408, 416
(1976); Gordon v. Raven Sys. & Research, 462 A.2d 10, 15 (D.C. App. 1983); McCarthy,
110 Wash. 2d at 821-22, 759 P.2d at 355-56.
67. There is no federal legislation regulating smoking in private workplaces. The
United States government has, however, adopted smoking restrictions covering the 6,800
buildings controlled by the General Services Administration. These restrictions apply to
approximately 890,000 federal employees. See 41 C.F.R. Part 101-20.105-3. In addition,
the Federal Labor Relations Authority has recently restricted the ability of several federal
agencies to change smoking policy without first negotiating with bargaining units. Treasury
Employees Union Chapter 250, 33 FLRA No. 8, 61-74 (Before Calhoun and McKee)
(Oct. 13, 1988), Nos. 0-NG-1524, 0-NG-1536 and 0-NG-1545.
68. This figure represents only those states with laws specifically aimed at private
sector workplaces. It does not include the various laws regulating smoking by public sector
employees in government-owned buildings or those public safety or occupational regula-
tions pertaining to smoking.
69. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-40q (West 1987 & Supp. 1988).
70. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 386.202-386.209 (West 1986).
71. IOWA CODE ANN. § 98A.1-98A.6 (West Supp. 1988).
72. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1580-A (Supp. 1988).
73. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 144.411-144.417 (West Supp. 1989).
74. MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 50-40-101-50-40-109 (1987).
75. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-5701-71-5713 (1986).
76. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 155:50-155:53 (Supp. 1988).
77. N.J. STAT. ANN. ch. 184, §§ 26:3D-23-26:3D-31 (West 1987).
78. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-20.7-1-23.20.7-7 (Supp. 1988).
79. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-101, 76-10-106, 76-10-108-76-10-110 (Supp.
1988).
80. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, §§ 1421-1428 (Supp. 1988).
81. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.160.010-70.160.900 (West Supp. 1988).
82. In a recent election in Oregon, Proposition 6-which would have imposed a vir-
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(2) Most state laws do not prohibit smoking in specific areas;
(3) Most provide exceptions for enclosed private offices; and
(4) Most provide for only minor penalties, such as minimal
fines, for violations.
Local city, county, or other municipal ordinances may also re-
strict smoking in private workplaces.83 Local ordinances are often
more restrictive and specific than state statutes. 84 Local ordi-
nances may specifically limit smoking in particular areas of the
workplace. Some of these local laws, such as the San Francisco,
California ordinance, also accord preferential rights to nonsmok-
ing employees within their work area.
Workplace smoking laws can be generally categorized into
three groups, according to the degree to which they intrude upon
an employer's discretion. These categories are: (1) the "least in-
trusive" laws, (2) the "partially intrusive" laws, and (3) the "most
intrusive" laws.
The least intrusive laws are relatively straightforward. They
merely require the employer to establish, post and implement a
written policy regarding smoking in the workplace. These laws
leave the specifics to the individual employers and do not dictate
the content of the policy. For example, New Hampshire's work-
place smoking law merely states:
An employer shall, within 6 months of the effective date of this
subdivision, establish and implement written rules governing
smoking and nonsmoking in the workplace. The rules shall be
readily available for viewing by the employees and may include
the designation of smoking and nonsmoking areas. Upon re-
quest, the employer shall provide a copy of the written rules to
any employee."5
Least intrusive laws can also be found in Connecticut, Maine and
Montana.
The partially intrusive laws are somewhat more specific. They
typically spell out the particulars that employers must include in
smoking policies, and indicate the types of efforts required of an
employer to accommodate nonsmoking employees. Often they in-
dicate a presumption that smoking should be prohibited in all ar-
eas except where it is specifically permitted.
Many partially intrusive laws require the employer to allocate
smoking and nonsmoking areas based on the numbers of smokers
tual ban on smoking in all public places, including places of work-was defeated by a three
to two margin.
83. Hundreds of local ordinances impact smoking in the workplace. The majority of
these are located in California. BNA, SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 66.
84. In Florida and Oklahoma, state law preempts all local smoking ordinances.
85. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155:52(I) (Supp. 1988).
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and nonsmokers. In addition, some state laws require employers to
place physical barriers or "buffer zones" between smoking and
nonsmoking employees. States with partially intrusive laws in-
clude Florida, Minnesota, Nebraska and Utah.
The most intrusive laws impose significantly greater burdens on
employers and limit management's discretion. These laws gener-
ally dictate which portions of the workplace must be designated as
no-smoking areas. Also, these laws usually specify the percentage
of space in employee cafeterias, lunchrooms and lounges that must
be reserved for nonsmokers. In some instances, these most intru-
sive laws give nonsmoking employees superior rights over smokers.
For example, the local ordinance in Palo Alto, California, provides
that "[i]n any dispute arising under the policy, the rights of the
nonsmoker shall be given precedence." 6
A. Objections to Legislation Concerning Workplace Smoking
The primary and most obvious objection to legislative enforce-
ment of workplace smoking is that it usurps the ability of employ-
ers to deal individually with employee concerns as they arise. Leg-
islation does not add to management's bevy of rights; rather, such
legislation takes away the considerable flexibility employers have
historically enjoyed in this area. In addition, there are numerous
other potential objections to legislation covering workplace
smoking.
First, smoking laws, like workplace smoking policies, can be dif-
ficult to enforce. Regardless of whether this responsibility is
placed on the employer or some governmental body, such as a law
enforcement agency or local health department, limited resources
and personnel makes rigorous enforcement of workplace smoking
laws unlikely. Second, because workplace smoking is generally
considered to be a mandatory subject of bargaining,87 legislative
restrictions may create conflicts between employers and unions.
Third, restrictions imposed by smoking legislation may interfere
with worker efficiency. For example, where compliance with the
law requires employers to rearrange work areas or segregate
smoking and nonsmoking employees, an employer's operations
may be disrupted and productivity decreased. 8 Fourth, smoking
86. Palo Alto Municipal Code, ch. 9.14, effective Feb. 1, 1984.
87. See infra note 95.
88. According to one study, of those employers polled which have implemented
smoking restrictions, seven percent responded that their policies have had a notable effect
on company costs. Eight percent indicated that employee productivity increased, while
three percent reported that their restrictions had a detrimental effect on employee produc-
tivity. BNA, SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-23. For an economist's view of the
"social costs" of smoking, including lost production, workplace efficiency and absenteeism,
[Vol. 25
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laws which give nonsmokers unlimited power to dictate the com-
pany policy for all workers are likely to be perceived as unfair by
others, especially employees who smoke. For instance, a local ordi-
nance in San Francisco allows even one employee to veto an em-
ployer's smoking policy in that employee's "office workplace."89
These types of policies will undoubtedly create resentment among
some employees and foster the perception that employers unfairly
favor nonsmokers.90 Fifth, where legislation requires employers to
physically separate smokers and nonsmokers, employers may ex-
perience a loss of managerial freedom. Finally, some state or local
laws regulating smoking in the workplace are likely to be chal-
lenged on constitutional or other grounds, and may thus embroil
employers in resulting litigation.91
As a result of these problems, smoking in the workplace is often
best left to the discretion of management and its employees. Ex-
cessive regulation in this area substantially undermines an em-
ployer's ability to respond flexibly to smoking-related problems,
while at the same time it creates a morass of practical and legal
problems. Moreover, smoking ordinances are not a panacea. They
cannot take into account the peculiarities of each workplace, nor
can they address the unique problems and personalities involved in
any given situation. Employers must still resolve the competing
interests of smoking and nonsmoking employees.
see R. TOLLISON & R. WAGNER, SMOKING AND THE STATE ch. 3 (1988).
89. San Francisco Municipal Health Code, Smoking Pollution Control Ordinance
No. 298-83 (Proposition P), effective Mar. 1, 1984.
90. Thus far, employee sentiments about smoking policies have been mixed. Overall,
42% of recent survey respondents said the smokers think their policy is "about right,"
while 33% indicated the rules were too restrictive; 53% of firms with policies said that
nonsmokers were satisfied, while 33% said nonsmokers wanted tougher restrictions. BNA,
SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
Press accounts of employee sentiment are decidedly mixed as well. See Do You Smoke?
Drink? If So, Some Employers Say, You May as Well Stay Home, BUSINEss FIRST-CO-
LUMBUS, vol. 3, no. 36, § 2, at 3; The Company Is Watching You Everywhere, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 15, 1987, § 4, at 21, col. 2, (Editorial Desk); Some Workers Upset by Company
Smoking Ban, AP, Jan. 21, 1987; Bans, Red Ink: Smoking: A Burning Issue, L.A. Times,
Nov. 21, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 1, (Metro Desk); Where There's Smoke, There's Ire: After
Years on the Defensive, Smokers Fight Back, L.A. Times, Jan. 14, 1988, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
91. The primary challenge is that smoking laws are often too vague to set definite
standards of compliance for employers. Indeed, several smoking ordinances have already
been struck down as unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Florida v. Burton, No. 80-999CO-
A-42 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1981) (ordinance restricting smoking in public places unconstitutionally
vague); Greater Rockford Food Servs. v. Orthoefer, No. 76-2447 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1976) (ordi-
nance restricting smoking in public place struck down as unduly vague and in violation of
constitutional guarantee of equal protection).
1989]
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IV. LABOR RELATIONS ISSUE
Unionized employers seeking to adopt workplace smoking poli-
cies, including policies necessitated by statute or ordinance, must
consider whether such policies can be adopted unilaterally without
bargaining with the union and whether the policy violates the col-
lective bargaining agreement.92
The National Labor Relations Act9 3 (NLRA) prohibits an em-
ployer from unilaterally changing the terms and conditions of em-
ployment without bargaining with the union representing the em-
ployees. Failure to do so constitutes an unfair labor practice under
section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.94
Rules governing workplace smoking have been held to be
"terms and conditions of employment" and, accordingly, are sub-
ject to mandatory collective bargaining.95 Thus, unless the collec-
tive bargaining agreement includes a broad "management rights"
clause9 6 permitting the employer to unilaterally establish plant
rules, the employer must first bargain with the union prior to re-
stricting smoking in the workplace. 97 This is especially true in sit-
92. In 1986, the AFL-CIO issued a National Resolution opposing unilateral at-
tempts by management to impose workplace smoking policies. It provides, in part:
Unions are faced with legislation or unilaterally imposed employer policies that
forbid smoking on the job and infringe on the rights of workers who smoke. Un-
ions have a legal responsibility to represent the interests of all their mem-
bers-smokers and nonsmokers. The AFL-CIO believes that issues related to
smoking on the job can best be worked out voluntarily in individual workplaces
between labor and management in a manner that protects the interests and rights
of all workers and not by legislative mandate.
See BNA, SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, app. D at 2. There have also been scattered
reports that rules regarding smoking in the workplace have become issues in union organiz-
ing drives.
93. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
94. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). The National Labor Relations Board has broad
powers to prevent and/or remedy unfair labor practices. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 160
(1982).
95. See Chemtronics, Inc., 236 NLRB No. 21 (1978). See also Pennsylvania v.
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 74 Pa. Commw. 1, 459 A.2d 452 (1983) ("[t]he subject
of whether employees may smoke at their workplaces appears to be at the center of those
subjects properly described as 'conditions of employment' "). See also Gallenkamp Stores
v. NLRB, 402 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1968); S. S. Kresge v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir.
1969); Wintergarden Citrus Prod. v. NLRB, 238 F.2d 128, 129 (5th Cir. 1956); NLRB v.
Hilton Mobile Homes, 387 F.2d 7, 10-11 (8th Cir. 1967).
96. An employer may insist upon a broad "management rights" clause. See NLRB
v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). In general, such clauses give employers
considerably more discretion over specific aspects of employment, which may include pro-
motions, transfers, plant rules, etc. It is significant that the NLRB General Counsel has
recently issued guidelines stating that employers must bargain with their unions before
instituting any drug-testing policy. See NLRB Memorandum GC 87-5 (Sept. 8, 1987).
The NLRB may adopt a similar position regarding smoking policies.
97. To date, no court has found a management rights clause sufficiently broad to
permit the unilateral imposition of a smoking policy. In Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania La-
bor Relations Bd., 74 Pa. Commw. 1, 459 A.2d 452 (1983) the court rejected an er-
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uations where smoking is a recognized right or privilege of
employment.
This issue was discussed in In re Parker Pen U.S.A. 8 In this
case, the employer-who had permitted on-the-job smoking for
over twenty years-unilaterally abolished employee smoking
rights that were guaranteed under the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The employer allegedly did so for health reasons after re-
ceiving the Surgeon General's 1986 report on involuntary smok-
ing.9 In resolving an employee grievance, the arbitrator held that
"both parties have an interest in addressing the profound issue
raised by the employer concerning the safety of the workplace."100
Accordingly, the arbitrator invalidated the employer's smoking
ban until any changes could be bargained over during upcoming
negotiations.
Even where the employer is required to impose smoking restric-
tions pursuant to state statute or local ordinance, it should bargain
over all discretionary aspects of the rule.101 In practice, bargaining
will be routinely required because most workplace smoking laws
leave a considerable amount of discretion to employers.0 2
Even if the unilateral implementation of a smoking policy does
not violate the NLRA, it may nonetheless violate the collective
ployer's argument that it had the "inherent managerial" authority to determine unilater-
ally whether to permit smoking at employee work stations. In the arbitration setting:
compare Ohio Dept. of Health, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 937 (1987) (Cohen, Arb.); Morelite
Equip. Co., 88 Lab. Arb (BNA) 777 (1987) (Stoltenberg, Arb.); Snap-On Tools Corp., 87
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 785 (1986) (Berman, Arb.); National Pen & Pencil Co., 87 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 1081 (1986) (Nicholas, Arb.); Litton Indus., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 308 (1980)
(Grabb, Arb.); and Sherwood Medical Indus., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 258 (1977) (Yarow-
sky, Arb.) (smoking restrictions upheld) with Dental Command, Dept. of the Army, 83
Lab. Arb. (BNA) (Allen, Arb.) 529 (1984); Union Sanitary Dist., 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
193 (1982) (Koven, Arb.); and Schien Body & Equip. Co., 69 Lab. Arb (BNA) 930
(1977) (Roberts, Arb.) (smoking restrictions invalid).
98. 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 489 (1987) (Fleischli, Arb.).
99. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 12.
100. 90 Lab. Arb. at 496.
101. There are no "smoking policy" cases directly on this point. The institution of a
smoking policy would constitute a "term and condition" of employment and, therefore, be
a mandatory subject of bargaining. See supra note 95 and cases cited therein. Neverthe-
less, neither union nor management may require the other to agree to provisions that are
unlawful or prohibited. Meat Cutters Local 421, 81 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1949); Borg-Warner
v. NLRB, 356 U.S. 342 (1958). Thus, proposed or existing provisions that directly conflict
with legislation automatically become illegal or unenforceable. Hughes Tool Co., 147
N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); Savannah Printing Specialties & Paper Prod. Local 604 v. Union
Camp Co., 50 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Ga. 1972). Legislation that provides employers with
discretion, however, such as that which simply requires employers to "adopt" a smoking
policy, would not be affected. That is, the particular discretionary aspects of the policy
would still be a mandatory subject of bargaining.
102. For example, the New Hampshire law cited at supra text accompanying note
85, merely directs the employer to adopt a smoking policy. All of the specifics are left to
the discretion of each individual employer.
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bargaining agreement. Arbitral decisions have consistently stated
that to be valid, an employer rule must be reasonable under the
circumstances and nondiscriminatory in application. 03 Arbitrators
have struck down employer smoking policies that fail to meet this
standard.
In Union Sanitary District,10 4 the arbitrator found that the em-
ployer could not unilaterally prohibit employees from smoking in
their offices. Specifically, the arbitrator found that the absolute
prohibition was arbitrary because there was no adequate basis for
the rule. Although the employer stated it wanted to protect non-
smoking employees, the evidence showed there were only two bar-
gaining unit members in the building who smoked; for six hours a
day they were not in their offices but were out in the field; and no
one complained about the smoking. Moreover, the California In-
door Clean Air Act of 1976,105 which the employer cited to justify
its ban, did not require a ban on smoking. Rather, that Act con-
templates a relatively flexible regulation of smoking which recog-
nizes the rights of both smokers and nonsmokers.10 6
V. How SHOULD EMPLOYERS RESPOND TO THE WORKPLACE
SMOKING ISSUE?
Each employer's reaction to the workplace smoking issue will,
naturally, depend on the needs and circumstances of its work-
place. It is important in any situation to encourage a spirit of co-
operation and communication among employees and management.
Indeed, a recent survey of 1,100 employers indicated that over
seventy percent expect employees to address workplace smoking
issues among themselves before invoking management's time and
103. See United Tele. Co. of Florida, 78 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 865 (1982)(designation
of no-smoking table in cafeteria upheld as reasonable in light of company and union's
interests in maintaining a healthy work environment and minimizing expenses and poten-
tial liability); H-N Advertising & Display Co., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 329 (1986), 88 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 1311 (1987)(rule banning smoking in area of plant where combustibles are
stored was reasonable and nondiscriminatory where worker safety was primary reason for
expanding rule and implementation of measures to improve safety is normally management
prerogative). See also supra note 97.
104. 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 193 (1982) (Koven, Arb).
105. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25940-25947 (Deering 1988).
106. See also Schien Body & Equip. Corp., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 930 (1977) (Rob-
erts, Arb.) (employer plant-wide smoking ban unreasonable because there was no proof
that the rule clearly benefitted nonsmokers since work area was well ventilated, nor was
there any indication that the ban directly improved workers' health). But cf. Ohio Dept. of
Health, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 937 (1987) (Cohen, Arb.) (state's modified smoking policy
for health department employees found reasonably related to legitimate objectives); More-
lite Equip. Co., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 777 (1987) (Stoltenberg, Arb.) (smoking ban at
workstations reasonable in view of fire dangers); Litton Indus., 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 308
(1980) (Grabb, Arb.) (rule limiting smoking to specific areas reasonable).
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efforts.1°7 Employers should also consider the following specific
issues:
(1) Is there an open line of communication so that employees
can effectively express their concerns and thereby informally re-
solve smoking-related disputes?
(2) Have employees complained about co-workers' smoking or
tobacco smoke in the work environment?
(3) If employees have complained, how many have done so, and
on what basis? Are such complaints properly attributable to em-
ployee rivalries or individual medical hypersensitivity(ies)?
(4) Is poor ventilation the cause of actual or perceived indoor
air quality problems? 10 8
(5) Would the imposition of smoking restrictions in the work-
place decrease productivity, adversely affect employee morale, vio-
late the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement or give
rise to discrimination claims?
(6) Could smoking disputes be resolved by management
through less drastic means, such as separating smokers from non-
smokers, erecting partitions or improving the company's ventila-
tion system?
After evaluating the work environment based on the foregoing
considerations, and addressing the likely accommodation options,
an employer should decide whether it is necessary to implement a
formal smoking policy.'0 9
107. HUMAN RESOURCES POLICY CORP., SMOKING POLICIES IN LARGE CORPORA-
TIONS (May 1988) [hereinafter SMOKING POLICIES]. See also BNA, SPECIAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 26 figure E (72% of surveyed employers urged employees to resolve smok-
ing-related problems themselves).
Other employer responses to complaints of workplace smoking included: (1) attempt to
get smoker to reduce smoking (22.5%); (2) do nothing (9.7%); (3) move complainer to
new work area (6.3%); (4) move smoker to new work area (3.4%); (5) other measures
(3.1 %); and (6) order smoker to discontinue smoking (0.9%). SMOKING POLICIES, supra,
at 12, Table 13. See also BNA, SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 26.
108. There is substantial evidence that air quality complaints are indicative of a
much larger problem, i.e., inadequate ventilation. For example, a January 1987 report pre-
pared by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) attributed
52 % of complaints connected to indoor air quality to "inadequate ventilation." Only 17 %
of the complaints were attributable to indoor contaminants, including tobacco smoke(which accounted for only 2%). In addition, chemicals emitted from carpeting, furniture
and copying machines also contribute to indoor air contamination. BNA, SPECIAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 9-10. Similarly, according to a report entitled Source Nature and
Symptomology of Indoor Air Pollutants prepared by ACVA, Atlantia, Inc., a Fairfax,
Virginia company specializing in the study and assessment of indoor air pollution, environ-
mental tobacco smoke was found to be the immediate cause of indoor air problems in only
four percent of the 233 major buildings investigated between 1981 and 1987. ACVA,
ATLANTIA, INC., SOURCE, NATURE AND SYMPTOMOLOGY OF INDOOR AIR POLLUTANTS 9-11
(1987).
109. A majority (63.8%) of the 1,100 corporations who responded to the SMOKING
POLICIES survey had not adopted any formal smoking policy. The survey also found that
the companies most likely to have smoking policies are geographically located in areas with
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VI. DRAFTING A SMOKING POLICY
In jurisdictions where workplace smoking is governed by a state
statute or local ordinance, employers must conform their policies
and practices to the law. In some circumstances, this may require
employers to adopt a formal smoking policy. In the vast majority
of jurisdictions, however, employers are still free to decide
whether a smoking policy is necessary or appropriate. In doing so,
employers may want to evaluate whether there is a predicate for
action. In this regard, they may find it useful to survey their em-
ployees to see if there is a consensus of opinion. Management may
also want to consult its labor unions, if any.
Should a company decide that a formal written policy is neces-
sary, the specifics of the policy will naturally depend upon the in-
dividual aspects of the workplace. Because of local differences,
particularly in those companies with decentralized decision mak-
ing, some companies have developed a smoking policy applicable
to only some divisions, offices or plants. Other employers have
adopted a smoking policy in response to a specific problem or
where they are governed by a particular local ordinance. In addi-
tion, companies tend to vary their smoking policies depending
upon the degree of specificity desired. A less specific smoking pol-
icy aimed at promoting cooperation and consideration might, for
example, state:
It is our policy to make every reasonable effort to accommodate
all employees within the constraints imposed by our physical
structure and financial resources. It is our firm conviction that
the wishes of smokers and nonsmokers can best be resolved
through cooperation, dialogue and common courtesy. Should a
dispute or concern arise, management and employees should
work together to seek a reasonable resolution consistent with
this policy.
A nonspecific policy such as this will increase flexibility and allow
management to resolve individual disputes on a case-by-case basis.
In contrast, some employers may opt for a smoking policy with
a greater degree of specificity. For instance, the employer may
want to designate particular smoking or nonsmoking areas or
workstations. The specific locations covered may include: private
offices, hallways, conference rooms, lunch rooms, restrooms and
auditoriums. 10
workplace smoking laws. SMOKING POLICIES, supra note 107, at 4. More recently, a
smaller BNA survey of 623 employers indicated that a minority (43%) of employers have
not adopted any workplace smoking policy. BNA, SPECIAL REPORT, supra note I, at 2.
110. If enforced in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner, a smoking policy may
subject an employer to potential liability. Indeed, inequitable enforcement could foster em-
ployee discontent and possibly support claims premised on breach of contract or tort claims
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Smoking bans, while rare, pose more serious problems."" This
is especially true if they proscribe off-duty behavior. In addition to
employee morale problems, these bans are likely to give rise to a
morass of legal claims.1" For these reasons, employers should be
extremely cautious before considering a total ban on workplace
smoking.
CONCLUSION
Smoking can be the subject of emotional debate in the work-
place. There are few uniform answers to guide management in
dealing with the issue. But, left with enough flexibility to address
the concerns of all of their employees, most employers generally
find that they can resolve smoking disputes by undertaking practi-
cal accommodations on a case-by-case basis.
Some specific options for resolving smoking disputes include:
(1) separating smokers from nonsmokers; (2) moving nonsmokers
closer to windows or fresh air ducts; and (3) improving ventilation
throughout the workplace. However difficult and legally complex
the smoking in the workplace issue has become, one thing is clear:
Employers have an obligation to accommodate the competing in-
terests of smoking and nonsmoking employees. It is equally clear
that in an era of increasing labor shortages, employers are redou-
bling their efforts to select and retain skilled and experienced
workers-smokers as well as nonsmokers.
against employers or individual supervisors. See Carroll v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 697 F.
Supp. 508 (D.D.C. 1988) (public employer not shielded from potential tort liability under
"official immunity" doctrine, because supervisor who failed to enforce smoking policy acted
outside course and scope of his employment). In Carroll, the plaintiff claimed that she had
developed lung disease allegedly from exposure to environmental tobacco smoke on the job.
In addition, she alleged that her supervisors took reprisals against her by giving her poor
performance evaluations, assigning her demeaning work and questioning the seriousness of
her health claims. On November 1, 1988, this case was settled for an undisclosed sum of
money.
I 1. The vast majority of employers with smoking policies do not ban smoking en-
tirely. As noted above, those which do typically do so due to product (food) contamination
concerns or because flammable materials are produced or stored in the workplace. And few
(five percent) give hiring preference to nonsmoking job applicants. BNA, SPECIAL REPORT,
supra note 1, at 17, 22. One notable exception pertains to police and fire departments,
which are faced with unique workers' compensation issues. See supra notes 24-28 and ac-
companying text. See also Bans, Red Ink: Smoking: A Burning Work Issue, supra note 90
(Pacific Northwest Bell bans smoking in all facilities; Radar Electric of Seattle will not
hire smokers; Capital City Products conducts seminars to help employees quit smoking).
112. For a thorough discussion of smoking bans, see Rothstein, supra note 24, at
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